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INTRODUCTION

We often wonder, especially in controversial cases, whether the
Supreme Court has reached the best result.' In some cases, we may also wonder
whether the Court has adopted a proper method of interpreting the
Constitution.2 A bit more abstractly, we may wonder about matters such as the
proper size of the Court's workload, even as the number of requests for
Supreme Court review has historically increased.4
Each of these concerns bears upon a vitally important but commonly
overlooked question: How should the Supreme Court, given its unavoidable
constraints5 and scarcities of recourses, 6 best be devoting its7 time, energy, and

I Witness, for example, the discussions following the Court's decision in the healthcare case
of NationalFederationofIndependent Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2
For representative approaches to constitutional interpretation, see, for example, PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist

Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1198-1209 (1987).
For a lively debate on such matters, see the various perspectives in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1998).

3
On the decreasing number of cases addressed on the merits, see, for example, Ryan J.
Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court's Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1219, 1234-46 (2012) (decreased mandatory Supreme Court jurisdiction, along with
increased ideological polarization); Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking
Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1373-74 (2006). For
Supreme Court docket analyses by Term, see, for example, The Statistics, 125 HARV. L. REv. 362
(2011).
4
According to the Court's website, "[t]he Court's caseload has increased steadily to a
current total of more than 10,000 cases on the docket per term. The increase has been rapid in
recent
years."
The
Justices'
Caseload, SUPREME
CT.
OF
THE
U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/justicecaseload.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). After the
intensive winnowing process, formal written opinions may be delivered in perhaps only 80 to 90
of those cases. See id.
5 For example, short of a constitutional amendment, most of the Court's efforts must relate
somehow to particular federal cases or controversies. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2; Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
6
For a vivid sense of some of the limitations in time, energy, relevant expertise, and in
powers of reflection and judgment of ordinary, non-superhuman, non-Herculean judges, see
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE chs. 7-10 (1986). Accuracy in decision-making is clearly a
scarce and costly good: "increasing accuracy is socially costly, because it requires a lengthier and
higher-quality legal process." STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 451

(2004).
Of course, it would for many purposes be misleading to think of the Supreme Court as
reducible to the sitting Justices and the vector of their individual efforts. We must consider the
role of Supreme Court clerks, staff, and librarians as well. See, e.g., Todd C. Peppers &
Christopher Zom, Law Clerk Influence On Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical
Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REv. 51, 53 (2008) (clerks as exerting a detectable ideological effect,
over and above any "selection effects" in being chosen by a particular Justice in the first place);
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attention? To oversimplify: What sorts of things should the Supreme Court be
seeking to accomplish, by which means, and what sorts of things should it
distinctly not be seeking to accomplish, by one means or another? Or, to
oversimplify even more severely: What, broadly, should the Supreme Court be
doing, and not doing?
Common sense suggests that the answers to these questions turn out to
be defective. Thus common sense tells us that the Court should, within the
bounds of what is otherwise permissible, do whatever is the most "important"
legal task. Or that the Court should do a variety of "important" tasks. Or
whatever the Court is "best" at doing. Or better at doing than any other
institution that might also undertake the task in question. We would need a
theory as to why the Court, and no one else, should do the legally most
important tasks.
In this context, being "best" at a task might mean something like the
most accurate, or the fastest, or requiring the least effort, or something like the
"most efficient," or the most productive, again relative to any other institution
that might undertake the same or similar task. These sorts of judgments would
often be rough, intuitive, and speculative. But we do not live in a world that
either permits more precision in such judgments, or that rewards our inattention
to such matters.
Thus common sense suggests, perhaps, that the Court should, within
the bounds of what is otherwise permissible, devote its efforts to those tasksperhaps one, or a few, or many tasks-at which it can outperform alternative
law-making institutions.
Common sense, however, is in this respect seriously flawed.
The thesis of this Article is that the Court should in this important
respect seek to improve upon common sense, for the sake of the broad public
well-being.
In particular, the judgment that the Supreme Court is better at some
task than any other law-making institution does not mean that the Court should
rightly undertake that task at all. The Court's being better, or more efficient, at
some legal task than other institutions does not mean that the Court, rather than
another institution, should perform the task in question. It is actually entirely
reasonable to conclude that the Court should not undertake, let alone
emphasize, some important tasks at which it is the undisputed performance
champion. It is also possible that for the sake of the public well-being, the
Court should, remarkably, undertake some tasks that other institutions would be
better at, or more efficient in performing.
This thesis may seem mysterious, if not implausible, in seeming to
invite unnecessary inefficiencies. But the thesis is rooted, by loose but

Peter B. Rutledge, A Review of "Sorcerers'Apprentices:100 Years ofLaw Clerks at the United
States Supreme Court," 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 369, 370-71 (2007).
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illuminating analogy, in the crucial normative8 idea of what is called
comparative advantage. 9 Below, this Article briefly presents the most basic
logic and value of the idea of comparative advantage.' 0 This Article then
develops the comparative advantage analogy" in the American legal context,
and critically assesses the Supreme Court's actual activities, choices, and
priorities.12 The idea of comparative advantage in the Supreme Court context
may not be intuitive, but it has much to recommend it.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE GENERAL IDEA OF COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE

A.

The InstitutionalPosition of the Supreme Court

Supreme Court Justices, individually and collectively, along with their
various assistants, do not face a market in which they must turn a literal
financial profit by selling units of particular goods and services to willing
buyers.13 The Justices do not, in that narrow literal sense, compete with the
various alternative producers of law, including Congress, congressional staffs,

For the difference between descriptive, or positive, versions of the idea of comparative
advantage, and normative versions, with which this Article will be primarily concerned, see Alan
V. Deardorff, Benefits and Costs of Following Comparative Advantage 7 (Jan. 12, 1998)
(discussion paper), available at http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/Papers401425/r423.PDF.
The idea of comparative advantage is usually traced to economist David Ricardo, with
credit being shared with Robert Torrens, James Mill, and John Stuart Mill. For an account of the
early development of the idea, see John Aldrich, The Discovery of ComparativeAdvantage, 26 J.
HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 379, 380-84 (2004).
10 See infra Part II. The argument below that following, by loose analogy, the normative
principle of comparative advantage can enhance the "well-being" of the overall public does not
presuppose any particular method of determining "well-being." Well-being need not be a matter
of wealth maximization, preference satisfaction, or of utility calculations. For background, see,
for example, JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING (1989).

1
The principle of comparative advantage was initially applied to the realm of international
trade in commodities. See Aldrich, supra note 9, at 380. The principle need not be confined to
that context, however, as it is largely a reflection of the widely applicable idea of opportunity
costs and is inseparable from familiar forms of cost-benefit analysis. See Deardorff,supra note 8,
at 6-8. There are many important differences between the scarce resources, incentives,
motivations, and stewardship obligations of bureaucrats, including Supreme Court Justices, on
the one hand, and those of property-owning buyers and sellers facing explicit monetary prices
and profitability constraints in a competitive market. See, e.g., Laurent A. H. Carnis, New
Perspectiveson the Economic Approach to Bureaucracy, 13 Q.J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 52, 56 (2010)
(referring to the work of Ludwig von Mises).
12 See infra Parts III-IV.
1
See sources cited supra note 11. Nor does the Court explicitly trade or sell portions of its
output, at variable prices, to anyone, including to other governmental actors that produce law as
an output.
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the President, administrative agencies and their staffs, state legislatures,
arbitrators, trial court and administrative law judges, and inferior appellate
courts. But in a broader sense, the Court competes with these institutions as an
alternative source of law.
Even with its substantial resources, the Court faces limits of time,
energy, expertise, budget, prestige, and authority. 14 The Court produces, at
whatever cost, a broad range of goods and services. Some of these goods and
services will be more or less concrete, others more abstract and intangible.
Their value can be assessed in various ways. They range from providing
solutions to particular disputes; to resolving coordination problems; to
presenting general legal guidance of a substantive or procedural nature; all the
way to producing, or perhaps detracting from, social predictability, fairness,
basic rights-recognition, economic efficiency, solidarity, and overall regime
legitimacy. 15
The Court does not produce these goods and services in isolation from
the various alternative producers of law referred to above.16 The Court not only
cooperates, but in some ways competes, with each of those alternative law
producers.' 7 Any choice of a supplier of law from among competing producers,
including the Court, may be alterable.' 8 Even as a competitive law producer,
though, the Court's product is also a complementary contribution, along with
those of its competitors, to the jointly produced overall rule of law.' 9 But these

See sources cited supra notes 5-7.
5
On coordination problems, see John M. Finnis, Law as Coordination,2 RATIO JURIS 97, 97
(1989). On fairness and efficiency in general with an emphasis on the latter, see generally Louis
KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). Consider also the contrast
between, say DredScott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), and Brown v. Boardof Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
16 See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
17 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (hierarchical status of
congressional judgments as to the 14th Amendment standard to which states should be held);
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (hierarchical status of state legislature's and governor's
judgment as to federal constitutional law and its binding authority); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. 304 (1816) (hierarchical status of state supreme court decisions on matters of federal
law); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (hierarchical status of congressional judgment as to
federal statutory constitutionality).
18
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
1
Thus the provisions of, say, federal health care and insurance reflect the joint, more or less
coordinated, contributions of Congressional legislation in the form of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119; the Court's decision in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (agency
implementing regulations; and any state opt-out decisions). For more uniformly harmonious,
complementary contributions by the Supreme Court to particular laws or regulations conceived
of as joint projects, see various Chevron-type cases, including Mayo Foundationfor Medical
Education v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011); Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, 551 U.S.
58 (2007); Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106 (2002). For a less harmonious ultimate
14
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complications should not obscure the fact that on various fronts, the Court is
one possible source or producer of law among others.
Importantly, the Court's products and methods can, within limits, vary.
In some respects, the Court has great discretion. The Court's legal products
can, in particular, be made with greater or lesser efficiency. From the
standpoint of overall well-being, the Court's activities and priorities can be
well-directed or misdirected. Depending on one's vantage point, the Court's
activities and priorities may bear significant costs.
Crucially, the Court's chosen priorities and pursuits must, inescapably,
involve what are called opportunity costs. 2 0 The opportunity cost of the Court's
decisions may fluctuate importantly when the Court chooses to do more of one
thing rather than another. 2 1 And, equally importantly, the opportunity cost of
other institutions' producing the same or similar legal product may also vary.22
Crucially, the Court may, relative to other institutions, be much better at certain
tasks, and only slightly better, relative to other institutions, at other tasks.
We take up the basic idea of comparative advantage and the related
idea of (comparative) opportunity cost immediately below. First, though, it is
useful to notice the significance of what is at stake. The Supreme Court cannot
address every significant matter within the permissible scope of its
jurisdiction.2 3 The Court must inevitably set priorities for itself, including
24
priorities as to cases and subject matter. As well, the Court must set other
priorities, involving serious tradeoffs, as to methods, techniques, standards, and
limits of its investigation, research, 2 5 and deference. 26 All such priority-setting
involves significant effects and significant opportunity costs.
The public stakes are substantial in this largely discretionary prioritysetting practice used by the Court. Well-chosen Court priorities, given what
other institutions could do, might reduce various sorts of important social
conflicts, and important injustices, along with various costly social
uncertainties. 2 7 Well-directed critical attention to the Court's decision-making

joint legal product, see, for example, GeneralDynamics Land Systems v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581,
600 (2004) (Court determining a particular EEOC interpretation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act to be "clearly wrong").
20
See infra Part II.B. Again, our reference, by analogy, to opportunity costs is meant to keep
open the range of ways in which the relevant costs and values can be measured. See sources cited
supra note 10.
21
See infra Part II.B.
22
For discussion, see infra Parts II.B., III.
23
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See infra Parts III.A., IV on Supreme Court case selection.
See infra Parts III.B-D.
26
See infra Part III.B. in particular on questions of "legislative fact" and related concerns.
27
For background, see Mancur Olson, Do Lawyers Impair Economic Growth?, 17 LAW &
Soc. INQUIRY 625, 625 (1992). Lack of Court deference to legislative and administrative policy
24

25
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as to its own priorities and practices might well promote the long-term health of
the society.28 Scholars have argued, for example, that the public good would be
promoted if courts, including the Supreme Court, were less deferential toward
statutes and regulations, and the factual findings and judgments embodied
therein, that reflect mere political or interest group pressures and self-serving
bargains. 29 The extent to which this important argument is actually wellfounded is among the issues briefly addressed in Section III below.
In the meantime, we should first clarify our references to opportunity
cost and to institutional comparative advantage.
B.

Opportunity Cost and the Supreme Court's Choices Among Activities

The idea of opportunity cost finds its home in describing behavior in
markets, as distinct from bureaucracies. 30 But the idea of opportunity cost is
broad, fundamental, and important. It can be applied by analogy, with
appropriate modifications, even to Supreme Court Justices and to the Court as a
whole, as well as to other law-making institutions.
The breadth of the idea of opportunity cost is illustrated by the fact that
unavoidably involve an opportunity cost. Thus buying a
activities
all
Lamborghini, going to the movies, obtaining a legal education, scouring a
judicial record, investigating claims made in a legislative history or in the
Federal Register, evaluating an empirical claim of fact, assessing an
administrative agency's prediction, taking a stroll, and even contemplating the

judgments in particular, and even unpredictable shifts in the patterns of such deference, can
introduce unnecessary uncertainties, with socially damaging consequences. See id. at 625-26
("court-made changes in laws ... can introduce new uncertainties and problems that limit
economic growth"). For a classic discussion of several forms and senses of 'uncertainty,' see
FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (Signalman Publishing 2009) (1921).
Professor Knight also distinguishes the idea of opportunity cost. Id. at 36.
28 For extended discussion, see, for example, IX GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M.
BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES 150 (1985).

29

See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial

Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 33 (1991) ("[A] wave of articles by legal scholars in various areas of
law has argued that interest group theory justifies changing judicial review to make it less

deferential to political outcomes"); Jonathan R. Macey, PromotingPublic-RegardingLegislation
Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 226-27
(1986) (identifying various advocates of a judicially "activist approach to non-public-regarding
statutes").
30 See James M. Buchanan, Opportunity Cost, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF

ECONOMICS 7296, 7298-99 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008),
available at http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id-pde2008_0000029&edition=
pde2008_pde2008&field=content&q=&topicid=&resultnumber-6. Opportunity costs are in the
most basic sense borne by the chooser, and in that limited sense not shiftable to other persons or
to the public in general. But as Professor Buchanan recognizes, "[t]here may, of course, be
consequences of a person's choice that impose utility losses on other persons." Id. at 3.
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starry heavens above and the moral law within, ' all involve an opportunity
cost.
Among the above examples, the Lamborghini, the movie ticket, and the
legal education involve costs in the much more familiar form of explicit
financial payments to the provider of the good or service in question. But those
goods and services, along with the various judicial activities, the stroll, and
even the contemplation, also involve opportunity costs.
For our purposes, we can define opportunity cost, at least by analogy,
as the value of the chooser's best available alternative to the activity actually
chosen.32 Buying a Lamborghini may, for example, preclude buying a condo, or
retiring a year earlier. Going to the movies may rule out an afternoon of gameplaying in one's basement, or taking a stroll. Taking a stroll may require giving
up grass-cutting income, or a movie. Contemplation may, as its opportunity
cost, in a rare case, involve the loss of thousands of dollars in income.
Law students recognize not only the payment of tuition, but
opportunity costs in the form of lost or reduced gainful employment while
studying law full time. Most importantly for our purposes, Supreme Court
personnel should recognize the opportunity costs of engaging in activities like
scouring a judicial record, scrutinizing a legislative history or the Federal
Register, assessing empirical claims, or second-guessing an administrative
prediction.3 3

3

For an endorsement of the latter activities, see IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL

REASON (1788), reprintedin PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 133, 269 (Mary J. Gregor trans., 1996).

32 We do not here need to specify how value is to be measured, as long as we are open
not
only to the subjective value to the chooser, but to the value, in the form of utility or otherwise, to
other persons or groups, including those affected favorably or unfavorably by the choice of
activity in question. And we should recognize that the best single alternative forfeited by a
particular choice may actually be complex, multi-faceted, or somehow plural. For brief
mainstream discussions of the idea of opportunity cost, see, for example, Buchanan, supra note
30, as well as N. GREGORY MANKIEW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMIcs 54, 260 (6th ed. 2011);

Robert E. Hoskin, Opportunity Cost and Behavior, 21 J. ACCT. RES. 78, 78 (1983) ("[A]lthough
the evidence is somewhat mixed, decision makers seemed to ignore or underweight [opportunity]
costs," particularly as "opportunity cost information is oftentimes unavailable or not collected");
Oscar W. Jensen, Opportunity Costs: Their Place in the Theory and Practice of Production, 3
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 48, 48 (1982) (referring to opportunity cost discussions that do
not involve a market, or indeed any person other than the decision-maker in question); David R.
Henderson,

Opportunity

Cost,

LIBRARY

OF

ECON.

AND

LIBERTY,

http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/OpportunityCost.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2013) (noting that
costs that are incurred inescapably, regardless of whether one chooses the original activity or the
otherwise foregone activity, do not count as opportunity costs of the original activity). For further
research on the extent to which opportunity costs, which are both important and usually
inexplicit, are ignored, see Shane Frederick et al., Opportunity Cost Neglect, 36 J. CONSUMER
RES. 553, 554-60 (2009).

For discussion of possible examples, see infra Parts III.B-D. Again, opportunity costs,
strictly, are directly borne by the choosing party, and not by those affected by the choice, but this
does not seem significant for our purposes, as suggested in supra note 30.
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Supreme Court Justices should, crucially, be more aware of the
possibility that some of the activities they choose to engage in may have, from
a public perspective, unnecessarily and unjustifiably large opportunity costs.
Such considerations are admittedly likely to be vague, and often
impossible to meaningfully quantify. Similarly hazy are the possible methods
by which the Court could be informally encouraged to avoid unnecessarily
large "public," or what we might call third party, opportunity costs. 34 But the
stakes are large enough to justify persevering along those lines, despite the
inevitable imprecision and the recourse to analogy.
By itself, the idea of an analogy to opportunity cost is close to the heart
of the analysis of Supreme Court practice below. But opportunity cost applies
even to a single individual, or a single institution, in utter isolation-like
Robinson Crusoe himself.35 The idea of opportunity cost can be applied to the
Court, and to its personnel, in a more realistic way by recognizing that other
institutions also act as sources of law. When we place the idea of opportunity
cost in the context of an analogy to the idea of comparative advantage, the
value of thinking about the Supreme Court's opportunity costs can be further
expanded.
C.

The Normative Principleof ComparativeAdvantage and the Proper
Role of the Supreme Court

In the loose sense required for our purposes, an individual3 8 may, or
may not, hold a comparative advantage39 with respect to other actors in

34

3
36

See Buchanan, supra note 30, at 1-2; Hoskin, supra note 32, at 79.
See Jensen, supra note 32, at 48, for the Robinson Crusoe reference.
See supra text accompanying notes 13-19.

37
This is not at all to suggest that an individual person, or a single institution, cannot hold a
comparative advantage in producing some good or service. See, e.g., Michael Sattinger,
Comparative Advantage in Individuals, 60 REv. ECON. & STAT. 259, 259 (1978); Edward M.
Scahill, Did Babe Ruth Have a Comparative Advantage as a Pitcher?, 21 J. ECON. EDUC. 402,
402 (1990) ("Even if a player were to have an absolute advantage over his teammate at two
positions,... he should specialize in that position for which his advantage is greater. A teammate
should fill the position for which the former player has an absolute advantage, but a comparative
disadvantage.").
3
See id.
3
For textbook introductions to the idea of comparative advantage, see, for example, PAUL
KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, ECONOMICS 30-34 (2d ed. 2009); N. GREGORY MANKIEW,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 54-55 (6th ed. 2011). See also Ronald Findlay, Comparative
Advantage, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 1 (Steven N. Durlauf &

at
available
ed.
2008),
eds.,
2d
E.
Blume
Lawrence
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_C000254&edition=current&q=com
parative%20advantage&topicid=&result number-1; Morgan Rose, A Brief History of the
Concept of Comparative Advantage, LIBRARY OF ECON. AND LIBERTY (Aug. 6, 2001),

http://www.econlib.org/cgi-bin/printarticle2.pl?file=Columns/Teachers/comparative.html.
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producing some good or service. The idea of a comparative advantage requires
clarification, however. After all, there is a literal sense in which any advantage
implies a comparison between at least two actors.
The simplest kind of advantage is not what the economists call a
comparative advantage. The simplest kind of advantage is instead known as an
absolute advantage. One producer of a particular good has an absolute
advantage over another producer of that good if the first producer is simply
faster, more efficient, more productive, or "better," at producing that good.40
Consider an example. Let us suppose that the Supreme Court can
produce a critical assessment of a fact-and-policy-laden legislative history in
three days, whereas an administrative agency would require at least four days
to produce a comparable quality assessment of the same legislative history. In
such a case, the Supreme Court would hold an absolute advantage over the
agency in producing the good-the assessment-in question.41
On that basis, we might be tempted to recommend that since the
Supreme Court is faster or "better" at such a task, the Court, rather than the
agency-or any other entity less efficient at such a task than the Court-should
normally perform the task in question. But then, by analogy, we notice that
professional athletes do not normally take on other paid work involving, say,
dexterity, coordination, or lifting ability, even when their time is availableand even if we assume that the professional athlete could do the job much more
efficiently than any other available candidate.4 2 Athletes thus do not do, even
for money, everything at which they are clearly best at doing.
Among the classic economists, Adam Smith is often associated with the idea of absolute
advantage, and David Ricardo with the idea of comparative advantage. For brief discussions of
absolute versus comparative advantage, see, for example, Monica Das, Absolute and
ComparativeAdvantage, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 2 (William
A.
Darity,
Jr.
ed.,
2d
ed.
2008),
available
at
www.skidmore.edu/-mdas/AbsoluteandComparativeAdvantage.pdf;
Economics
A-Z,
ECONOMIST, www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z/c#node-2159328 (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
For some complications, see Edmund Conway, Ricardo's Theory Shows That Win- Win Situations
Do
Exist,
THE
TELEGRAPH
(Sept.
1,
2009,
5:55
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/6122712/Ricardos-theory-shows-that-win-winsituations-do-exist.html. A law, or a kind of law, could for our purposes count as a relevant
"good."
41
As descriptions of the way the world operates, simple models of trade as reflecting either
absolute or comparative advantage principles are likely to be unrealistic in various ways. See the
sources cited supra note 40. As well, the areas in which a producer holds an absolute or
comparative advantage may well change over time for a variety of reasons. See id; SUNY
LEVIN
INST.,
TRADE
AND
GLOBALIZATION
8-23
(2013),
available
at
http://www.globalizationl01.org/uploads/File/Trade/tradeall.pdf
(discussing
absolute and
comparative advantages as affected by, among other factors, government policies).
42
But see Snapper Drafts Brett Favre to Promote its Lawn Mowers, GROUNDS
MAINTENANCE, http://grounds-mag.com/news/snapper _brett favre/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2013)
for the case of Brett Favre and the utility derived from cutting his own lawn, with or without
financial compensation.
40
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The idea of comparative, as distinct from absolute, advantage helps
explains this. The idea of comparative advantage suggests that even if the
Supreme Court could do every judicial task, including legislative fact
assessment, better than any other institution, the public well-being, overall,
would actually be better served if the Court avoided performing many such
tasks. Other institutions, including Congress, agencies, state legislatures,
arbitrators, and other courts may well hold crucial comparative advantages,
relative to the Supreme Court, even if the Supreme Court holds an absolute
advantage in all such tasks. The Court may be hugely superior at certain tasks,
and only slightly superior at other tasks, at which it does not hold a
comparative advantage.
The important idea is that comparative, as distinct from absolute,
advantage is a matter of comparing the opportunity costs of two producers of
some particular good. Generally, one entity holds a comparative advantage in
producing a good where it can do so with a lower opportunity cost 4 3 than the
opportunity cost that is incurred by another entity in producing, at least
roughly, the same good. We thus ask how much value must one entity give up,
or not produce, in choosing to produce the particular good in question,
compared to the value that a competing producer must give up, or not produce,
in choosing to produce that same or similar good. Where an entity holds a great
advantage over other producers of some goods, but a lesser advantage in
producing other goods, it will not hold a comparative advantage in the latter
cases.
Thus the professional athlete may be better at heavy landscaping tasks
than, say, a college student seeking summer income, and thus may hold an
absolute advantage. But the opportunity cost of landscaping, to the professional
athlete, may be missing a lucrative professional game, or a crucial practice, in
which thousands of fans and much value may be somehow invested. The
opportunity cost of landscaping for the college student, on the other hand,
might be a substantially lesser amount-perhaps foregone barista income for
that same period of time.4
What this suggests, normatively, is that the professional athlete, and the
college student, and the public in general, comprising sports fans as well as
coffee drinkers, might well all be better off if the professional athlete chooses

43
4

See supra Part II.B.
For a quick recounting of the basic logic involved here, see, for example, Paul M. Johnson,

Comparative

Advantage,

A

GLOSSARY

OF

POL.

ECON.

TERMS,

www.auburn.edu/-johnspm/gloss/comparative-advantage (last visited Oct. 11, 2013). Notice that
the opportunity cost usually refers to the highest value (realistically) available alternative
activity, which otherwise could have been engaged in. We might instead ask about the value of
the activity that the actor in question actually would have chosen. But this approach would in its
own way be no less speculative. For our purposes, focusing on what an actor supposedly would
have done, rather than on the best that they realistically might have done, would reduce the
normative guidance-value of our inquiry.
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not to do the heavy landscaping work, despite his superiority at that task.45 The
overall value of what is jointly produced by both parties can be increased if the
professional athlete thus limits the scope of his activities, regardless of his
broader talents.
The idea of comparative advantage suggests, by analogy, that even if
we assume, say, that the Supreme Court is better than any other institution at
assessing complex matters of legislative fact 4 6 and policy, the Court may well
be best advised, for the sake of the greater overall well-being, to not engage in
such an activity, or at least to substantially defer to the judgments of other
entities in such matters.
The key point is this: while the Court is busily and expertly engaged in
just such activities, it is necessarily foregoing the performance of other tasks of
great public value-perhaps far greater public value than some other entity
would have to forego creating if that entity were primarily responsible for
assessing complex matters of legislative fact and policy.
That is, the opportunity cost of the Court's devoting its time, attention,
effort, and other resources to more or less re-determining matters of legislative
fact, compared to the opportunity cost of a specialized agency's making or
reviewing its own such determinations-whatever we count as a product
corresponding to the Court's result-is likely to be greater in the case of the
Court. The public value of the Court's most significant alternative activity
thereby foregone is likely to be greater than that of the agency or other
governmental entity. The Court should thus typically avoid or minimize
engaging in just this sort of legislative fact re-determination process, given its
typical lack of a comparative advantage in this area.
One would then naturally wonder where in general the Supreme Court
is likely to have a comparative advantage, if it does not have a comparative
advantage in investigating and assessing the cogency of arguments over
legislative fact and policy. Again, hard and indisputable data on such matters
will unfortunately not be available.47

45
One entity's specializing where it has a comparative advantage, leaving the production of
other goods to other producers where it has an absolute but not a comparative advantage due to
its higher opportunity cost, may benefit both entities and increase overall value. See SUNY
LEVIN INST., supra note 41; Gregory W. Bowman, The Comparative and Absolute Advantages
ofJuniorLaw Faculty: Implicationsfor Teaching and the Future ofAmerican Law Schools, 2008
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 171, 183-84 (discussing cases in which all parties benefit).
46
For a brief discussion and citations to some of the literature on matters of complex
legislative fact and policy, see infra Parts III.A.-III.B.
47
See Hoskin, supra note 32, at 78. Consider also complications such as possible self-serving
motives, contrary to the public well-being, that may taint the products of any decision-making
entity. See, for example, the issues of judicial deference to an agency's determination of the
scope of its own jurisdiction posed in City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.
2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 524 (2012), and the question of judicial deference to arguably
self-serving administrative agency determinations, as discussed in Timothy K. Armstrong,
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But we might well imagine that every day devoted by an individual
Justice, or by the Court, to pursuing just such matters must unavoidably be one
fewer day devoted to resolving the nation's most disruptive, uncertain, and
otherwise costly basic constitutional tradeoffs, at the level of principle. Or one
fewer day of resolving the most socially costly splits in the federal circuits. Or
even one fewer day invested in enhancing the persuasiveness or guiding power
of the Court's constitutional opinions. It is not difficult to imagine that the
Supreme Court ordinarily holds a comparative advantage over other entities at
one or more of the latter such tasks. We further explore these possibilities
below.
III. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, OPPORTUNITY COST, AND THE COURT'S
CHOICES AMONG SPECIFIC TASKS AND METHODS
A.

The Court'sDiscretionaryTasks in General

Within broad limits, the Court has a choice of tasks and methods. The
Court, it has been said, "is awash in an ocean of discretion." 4 8 The public value
created by their choices of tasks and methods, and the execution thereof, is,
however, not unconstrained. Judge Richard Posner has colorfully argued that
the Justices are less representative of the American public than
elected officials are. They also lack ready access to much of
the information that elected officials obtain routinely in the
course of their work. They have much smaller, less specialized
staffs, and as lawyers they have professional biases and
prejudices that can distort their legislative judgments.
Cocooned in their marble palace, attended by sycophantic staff,
and treated with extreme deference wherever they go, Supreme
Court Justices are at risk of acquiring an exaggerated opinion
of their ability and character. 49
More specifically, the breadth of the Supreme Court's assumed
responsibilities has not always prompted the Justices to develop expertise in,
for example, statistical methodologies, or in the key social sciences.o
Is it possible, though, to imagine a Supreme Court that tends, more
than it does currently, to specialize where it likely holds a comparative
advantage, and to avoid tasks where it likely does not? Perhaps Supreme Court
Justices are in this respect open neither to changes in their incentives, nor to

Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 206-07
(2004).
48

RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 272 (2008).

49

Id. at 306.

50

See id at 312.
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reassessing their practices and priorities at their own initiative. Perhaps the
Justices, like many other long-term government officials, tend to maximize
their own preference satisfaction, as potentially distinct from the public wellbeing.' Or perhaps the Justices are devoted chiefly to advancing a single goal:
"making the law more consistent with their policy preferences." 52 And perhaps
"[n]either mass public opinion, the views of relevant elite groups, nor any other
segment of the world outside the Court has control over the Justices'
choices."5 3
But even if this is all true, it is still possible that increasingly focusing
its efforts on matters where the Court holds a comparative advantage could tend
to enhance the Court's influence, esteem, and the Court's own institutional
satisfaction. Supreme Court Justices certainly may not all share identical
priorities.5 4 They may, like most of us, pursue a variety of goals and values. 55
Among these goals may be not only promoting their basic policy preferences,56
and promoting their reputation or level of respect among prestigious
evaluators, 57 but genuinely "seeking to serve the public interest"58 as well.
Each of these latter goals could promote greater judicial attentiveness
to considerations of comparative advantage. Admittedly, some Supreme Court
Justices might be reluctant to surrender any of their current judicial tasks to any
other lawmaking entity. 5 9 But it is possible that the reputation of and the respect
accorded the Court by elite groups could eventually come to depend more
significantly on judgments as to comparative advantage. Or the Court could
increasingly appreciate how considerations of comparative advantage might
promote its most basic legal preferences, as well as its conception of the public
See, e.g., Morris Silver, Economic Theory of the ConstitutionalSeparation of Powers, 29
PUB. CHOICE 95, 96 (1977).
52
LAWRENCE BAUM, MOTIVATION AND JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 6 (Mar. 30, 2007), available at
www.faculty.virginia.edu/judging/Documents/motivation.lb.pdf; Lawrence Baum, What Judges
Want: Judges' Goals andJudicialBehavior,47 POL. RES. Q. 749, 755 (1994).
5
Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the
American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1580 (2010).
st

54

See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 572 (7th ed. 2007).

5
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 48, at 11 (citing "income, power, reputation, respect, selfrespect, and leisure"); Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial
Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1531 (2009) (the Supreme Court as "a group of nine
judges who make strategic decisions that are motivated by a wide range of preferences, values,
and commitments").
56
See sources cited supra note 52.
57
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 48, at 11.
58
Anthony Downs, A Theory ofBureaucracy, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 439, 442 (1965) (referring,
classically, to bureaucratic officials generally, rather than to judges or Supreme Court Justices in
particular).
59
At a more general level, see id at 449 (ongoing struggles between agencies regarding their
range of "territory").
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good. 60 The Court might also increasingly appreciate that obtaining reliable
information, especially in technical or social-scientific-intensive areas, is
costly 6' for the Court, in various ways.
The Court's own caseload, or its gate-keeping criteria, could easily be
adjusted to steer the Court's efforts toward the kinds of activities where the
Court is likely to hold a comparative advantage.62 The relevant Supreme Court
Rule refers specifically to the existence of "an important federal question" in
two separate sections,63 and to "an important question of federal law" in a third
section.6 The Rule specifically discourages petitions alleging merely
"erroneous factual findings." 65 With regard to matters such as circuit splits on
clearly less significant matters, if such splits must be resolved at all, one can
imagine that a comparative advantage at such a task might be held either by
Congress, by the outlier circuit or circuits, or by a hypothetical court
established to resolve less than momentous circuit splits. 66
At both the initial caseload or gate-keeping stages, and then beyond,
the Court would be well-advised to focus its institutional time and energy, and
its other resources, on activities in which, as far as can reasonably be
determined, the Court likely holds a comparative advantage over alternative
producers of law-and correspondingly, to avoid, to the extent possible, those
activities in which it does not hold a comparative advantage.
Thus, as we have suggested above, 67 the Court should typically avoid
self-directed research into disputable matters of legislative fact and social
science. The Court should typically avoid sifting complex and indeterminate

See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
See Downs, supra note 58, at 445. See also id at 442 (noting that "[d]ecisionmakers have
only limited capabilities regarding the amount of time they can spend making decisions, the
number of issues they can consider simultaneously, and the amount of data they can absorb
regarding any one problem").
60
61

62
63

See SUP. CT. R. 10.
Id. at R. 10(a)-(b).

6
Id. at R. 10(c). Not all conflicts among circuit court decisions, or other decisions
addressing federal constitutional issues, regardless of their degree of compatibility with Supreme
Court case law, need be thought of by the Court as "important."
65

Id

For an exceptionally interesting general discussion of the Court's use of its certiorari case
selection process, see United States v. Pleau, 680 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Torruella,
J., dissenting), petitionfor cert.filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3127 (Aug. 21, 2012). For further discussion,
see LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, SETTING THE NATION'S LEGAL AGENDA:
CASE
SELECTION
ON
THE
U.S.
SUPREME
COURT
1,
available
at
http://epstein.usc.edu/research/cert.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2013) (Court is rejecting 99% of
requests for review via certiorari, and annually determining less than 100 such cases on the
substantive merits); Frederick Schauer, Is It Important To Be Important?: Evaluating the
Supreme Court's Case-SelectionProcess, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 77, 78-86 (2010).
67 See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
66
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legislative histories and administrative records. But beyond the legislative
record, the Court should also avoid even brief, limited, unguided forays into
factual research, particularly where the opportunities for expert critique of the
Justices' assumptions and findings are limited.
These general recommendations are not in the slightest based on the
assumption that the Justices are less than fully competent at such tasks. Our
assumption could even be that the Court invariably executes such tasks
superbly well, and indeed "better" than any other governmental or legal entity.
The excellence of the Court at such tasks is for our purposes not in issue. The
problem is instead that the principle of comparative advantage, building on
differences in the opportunity cost of engaging in such activities, suggests that
the public well-being could be enhanced if the Court left such activities to other
entities when the Court appears to lack a comparative advantage.
B.

JudicialReview ofLegislative Factfinding

Let us briefly expand on these considerations. The Court is, as we have
reluctant to review findings of ordinary adjudicative fact, in the sense of
what particular events actually occurred in a given case. 69 That is, the Court
typically avoids re-determining which of two cars had the red light, or entered
the intersection first. But the Court's attitude toward re-determining, and even
investigating, the legislative facts that inform policy judgments,7 0 is more
ambivalent. Legislative facts are often broader questions of social science, such
as the effects of violent video games, or the consequences of decriminalizing a
drug. The Court's attitude seems to vary from a principled rejection of redetermining legislative facts 7 to a more aggressive, noticeably less deferential
attitude toward legislative fact determinations by other entities.72 A number of
commentators have, not surprisingly, focused their attention on improving-as
distinguished from limiting-the Court's own determinations of legislative fact
based on "general data."73 Common sense admittedly suggests that
seen, 68

See SUP. CT. R. 10; see also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
See Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to the Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARv. L. REv. 364, 404 (1942), cited in Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial
Reception ofLegislative Facts,41 VAND. L. REv. 111, 111-12 (1988).
70
See sources cited supra note 69.
71
See, for example, the logic of Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 463-64
(1981) (environmental effects of cardboard and plastic milk cartons).
72
See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669-711 (1981) (judicially
reassessing the weight, as well as the legitimacy, of the putative safety interest as actually
furthered by the state statute at issue); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 771-781 (1945)
(safety consequences of varying limits on train lengths).
7
See Woodhandler, supra note 69, at 113 (citing the views of several proponents of reform
of the judicial response to questions of legislative fact).
68

69

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss2/5

16

Wright: At What is the Supreme Court Comparatively Advantaged?

2013] AT WHATIS THE SUPREME COURT COMPARATIVELYADVANTAGED? 551

"improving" is often a good thing. From our perspective, however, such reform
would amount to the Court's improving its performance of tasks that the Court
typically should not undertake regardless.
C.

CourtReview ofLegislative History

In a loosely related way, the familiar debates over whether the Court's
scouring of legislative history is largely just a "makeweight" activity that
mostly reinforces prior convictions 7 4 are, for our purposes, beside the point.
Whether the criticisms of recourse to legislative history presented by Justice
Scalia75 are valid or not is similarly beside the point. Even if such problems
could be overcome, and the Court were "best" at parsing legislative history, it
is likely that some other entity, such as the administrative agency most directly
involved in a case, faces a lower opportunity cost in producing its own
assessment of legislative history, than does the Supreme Court. In the same
length of time, and for the same effort, the Court could, instead, say, uniquely
promote an important constitutional right, or even avoid a constitutional
disaster.
In contrast, the specialized agency, if not assessing the legislative
history, might well maximize the public value of its time and energy by, let us
reasonably say, doing some fraction of the work necessary to begin to
promulgate a rule pursuant to a statute within its purview. The agency's
opportunity cost would thus likely be, in comparison with the Supreme Court's,
modest. In such circumstances, the public well-being would evidently be best
served by leaving the interpreting of legislative history largely to the agency,
given its likely lower opportunity cost.
D.

Supreme Court Extra-RecordResearch

A similar analysis, and a similar conclusion, are involved in typical
cases of research into factual issues outside the judicial record, undertaken by

74
For a noteworthy debate on this point, see the opinions of Justices Stevens and Scalia in
Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276-79 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Id. at 279, 280-81 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
For commentary and perspectives, see Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative
History in the Supreme Court, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 205, 206-07 (2000).
7
See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 542 U.S. 241, 267 (2004); Bank One Chicago,
516 U.S. at 279-81 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). For further
critique and some responses, see Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History Be An
Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 813-15 (1998). For an influential more
positive view, see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses ofLegislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65
S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 848-61 (1992).
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Supreme Court Justices and their staff.76 Some, but not all, of the crucial
decision-making in such cases can be delegated to staff. Consider the recent
example of Justice Breyer's extra-record research in Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass'n, a case involving state regulation of the sale or rental of
violent video games to minors. In Brown, Justice Breyer discussed the nature
of his extra-record research, the extent of the research delegation to staff, and
some important elements of his research criteria and methodology.79
Justice Breyer's extra-record social science research involved, at a
minimum, his own characterization of each of a substantial number of
presumably complex research articles as either supporting or not supporting the
California Legislature's concern for the well-being, primarily, of the minors in
question.80 Doubtless the overall research task can in a sense today be
performed-by any genuinely qualified person-faster, more thoroughly, and
For discussions of this practice from a variety of perspectives, see, for example, Edward K.
Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J 1263, 1263 (2007)
("[J]udges facing unfamiliar and complex scientific admissibility decisions can and should
engage in independent library research to better educate themselves about the underlying
principles and methods"); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court ExtraRecord Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 26-35 (2011); Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme
Court Fact Finding,98 VA. L. REv. 1255, 1305-11 (2012); Adam J. Siegel, Note, Setting Limits
On JudicialScientific, Technical, and OtherSpecialized Fact-Findingin the New Millennium, 86
CORNELL L. REv. 167, 168 (2000) ("[E]ven if such independent factual inquiries by judges may
increase the likelihood of 'correct' admissibility determinations, such activities run counter to the
spirit of our judicial system, which encourages the vigorous adversarial presentation of evidence
and affords all parties unbiased and impartial gatekeepers"). For a crucial underlying
endorsement of extensive appellate judicial research in general, see Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d
1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Leventhal, J., concurring) ("[o]ur present system of review
assumes judges will acquire whatever technical knowledge is necessary as background for
decision of the legal questions"). See also id at 69 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
n
131 S. Ct. 2729, 2761, 2771-72 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
78
See id at 2761-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
7
Justice Breyer prefaced his elaborate bibliographical listings with the following remarks:
With the assistance of the Supreme Court Library, I have compiled these two
appendixes listing peer-reviewed academic journals on the topic of
psychological harm resulting from playing violent video games. The Library
conducted a search for relevant articles on the following databases.. . . The
following search terms were used . .. After eliminating irrelevant matches
based on title or abstract, I categorized these articles as either supporting ...
or not supporting/rejecting the hypothesis that violent video games are
harmful. ... Many, but not all, of these articles were available to the
California Legislature or the parties briefing this case. I list them because
they suggest that there is substantial (though controversial) evidence
supporting the expert associations of public health professionals that have
concluded that violent video games can cause children psychological
harm.. . . And consequently, these studies help to substantiate the validity of
the original judgment of the California Legislature, as well as that judgment's
continuing validity.
Id. at 2771-72 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80
See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
76

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss2/5

18

Wright: At What is the Supreme Court Comparatively Advantaged?
2013] AT WHAT IS THE SUPREME COURT COMPARATIVELYADVANTAGED? 553

often more cheaply than several generations ago. 8' But the increased speed with
which such tasks can be performed by nearly any technically competent
researcher does not tell us much about the opportunity costs of someone's
doing the task, or about, specifically, relative changes in the opportunity cost of
different persons' doing the task.
In the case of Justice Breyer's extra-record research in Brown, the
payoff of the research was said to be (further) evidence that there are
"substantial," 82 though "controversial,"8 3 grounds for the California statute in
question. But most of the studies were, as Justice Breyer notes, already citable
by parties or expert amici, and available to the California Legislature at the
time of statutory enactment. 84
As well, taking merely the purported bottom-line of each article at face
value, with each article counted as no less and no more than one, meta-analyses
aside, may be appropriate for some purposes, but less appropriate for other
purposes. It may not be clear that we should expect serious statistical or other
methodological flaws at equal rates in the studies that find, and in the studies
that do not find, any interesting correlations. The degree to which even a large
number of valid studies genuinely tell us something about the phenomenon we
really care about, rather than about merel some loose surrogate phenomenon
instead, may also be surprisingly modest.8
But these concerns are for our purposes actually minor. They suggest
mainly that the value of perusing such studies may be limited. And our primary
concern is again not with whether Supreme Court Justices, Congress,8 6 or state
legislatures ordinarily best handle such empirical studies, in the course of
producing their legal product. We may again merely assume that the Court
handles such empirical materials better than, say, legislatures do in producing
their own legal product. We assume that at some stage, such research is worth
doing. Our primary concern is instead with the comparative opportunity costs
of the Court and of the legislature or the administrative agency in producing
81

See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 76, at 1290-91. We thus do not attempt to place any weight on
the fact that Brown was argued on November 2, 2010, and not decided until June 27, 2011.
82
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2771 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

83

Id

84

See id. at 2771.

8
See John P. A. Ioannidis, Why Most PublishedResearch FindingsAre False, 2 PLoS MED.
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/fetch
available
at
(2005),
696,
696-701
Object.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2Fl 0.1371%2F journal.pmed.0020124&representation=PDF.
See also Jim Manzi, What Social Science Does-and Doesn't-Know, CiTY J. (Summer 2010),
www.city-journal.org/printable.php?id=6330.
86
For a thoughtful perspective on the optimal roles of the Supreme Court and Congress in the
broader realm of social fact-finding, see Neal Devins, CongressionalFactfinding and the Scope
ofJudicialReview: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 50 DuKE L.J. 1169, 1170, 1206 (2001). See also id
at 1206 ("Congress is better positioned to find social facts, but it is far from clear that Congress
has the incentives to make full use of its superior factfinding resources.").
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their respective corresponding legal products. In cases of extra-record research,
it seems unlikely that the Court, or its members, typically holds a comparative
advantage.
Certainly, rational persons facing a choice among tasks will concern
themselves with more than just opportunity costs. It is possible to believe that
in a given case, a general kind of case, or even in all cases, the Court's legal
product will be more socially valuable-a better product-than the
corresponding product of any other law-creating entity. Or one could believe to
the contrary. A case can certainly be made that American judicial review in
general has historically led to decidedly mixed results.
In any event, and regardless of what we think about the value of one
form or another of judicial review, the value of the idea of comparative
advantage remains. We can call any Supreme Court decision the same product,
a better product, or a worse product than the corresponding lower court
decision, legislative statute, or administrative rule. Such characterizations make
little difference for our purposes. The Court need not be producing the same
product as other institutions for the idea of comparative advantage to apply.
David Ricardo's classic example of England and Portugal's producing wine
and cloth, 8 and engaging in trade in these items, illustrates this point. No
assumption need be made that Portuguese wine-in general, or any particular
variety thereof-is the same product as English wine. 89 Portuguese wine may
be more valued than English wine. We may think with similar freedom about
the differences between Supreme Court and the law-products of other entities,
while still applying, by analogy, the idea of comparative advantage.
Of course, David Ricardo's discussion" considers possible overall
benefits accruing from explicit trade or exchange between England and
Portugal. In the Brown9 1 case, by contrast, neither the Court nor Justice Breyer
even attempted to engage the California Legislature or anyone else in anything
like a voluntary, explicit exchange of one or more goods. The Court majority in
Brown at most rejected the "offer" of the California legislative product. 9 2
The absence of any explicit trade, among law-producing institutions, of
multiple goods merely means, as we have said, 93 that we are using the idea of

8
See the numerous examples alluded to in R. George Wright, The DistractingDebate Over
JudicialReview, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 47, 53-56 (2008).
88
See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 119-43

(Dover 2004) (1817).
89
For a mixed picture of the results of recent English winemaking, see The History of
English
Wine, www.english-wine.com/history.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
90
91

92
9

See RICARDO, supra note 88, at ch. 7.

See Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738-42 (2011).
See id and accompanying text.

See, e.g., supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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comparative advantage by analogy, in an extended sense, for its considerable
power in exposing the limits of common sense.
For our purposes, it is irrelevant whether the public benefits of
institutions' focusing on their relative opportunity costs, and on pursuing tasks
at which they hold a comparative advantage, accrue through explicit trade or
not. All else equal,94 professional athletes should not, for the sake of the public
well-being, do their own law maintenance, given the relatively great
opportunity cost of doing so. Their hiring or bartering with anyone else to do
such work is secondary. And an analogous conclusion could be reached in
contexts in which the Supreme Court expends its resources but is not engaged
in explicit trading with other law-producing entities.
It is also possible to investigate the opportunity costs of the Court's
reassessing matters of legislative facts, of scouring legislative histories, and of
researching technical issues beyond the accumulated record. In many such
cases, we may conclude that even if the Court is in some sense better at such an
activity than any other law-making entity, the opportunity cost for the Courtperhaps resolving on principled, doctrinal grounds a deeply costly circuit split
on a practically vital matter-seems disturbingly high. And this conclusion
would be of fundamental importance.
But the fullest applications of the doctrine of opportunity cost and
comparative advantage clearly arise when we have a product of a legislature or
of an agency on the one hand, and the more or less comparable 9 5 product of the
Supreme Court on the other. In such cases, we can investigate the respective
value of whatever the legislature or the agency 96 on the one hand, and the Court
94
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
9
The most readily comparable cases will typically involve an administrative agency's
adjudication of a case, followed, eventually, by the Supreme Court's adjudication of the same
case. In these cases, we can ask what the Supreme Court could have done instead if it had not
taken the case, and we can ask, at least, what the administrative agency could have done if it had
not decided the case at some relatively high internal agency level, with the Court not becoming
involved at a later point.
96
A number of the legion of Chevron cases involve some sort of attempt by both a specialist
administrative agency and the Supreme Court to produce law in the form of an interpretation of a
term in a statute, or a determination of whether a particular policy can count as legally
reasonable. Deference issues can amount to a question of who is to produce the legal product.
The seminal case is Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). For a
sampling of the various division-of-labor or law-production permutations, see United States v.
Home Concrete & Supply, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843 (2012) (Breyer, J., plurality opinion) (Congress
as sometimes explicitly or implicitly determining the proper judicial versus agency division of
labor through leaving a legislative gap); Mayo Foundationfor Medical Education v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713-14 (2011) (implicit delegation by Congress to agency, resulting in
Chevron deference by the Court to the reasonable agency rule); FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
556 U.S. 502, 515-16 (2009) (agency must present permissible and good reasons for a conscious
change in agency policy); Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173-74 (2007)
(discussing some implicit indicators of congressional intent that the courts should defer to the
relevant agency); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 268-69 (2006) (under the circumstances,
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on the other, could have realistically produced if they had left the matter in
question more largely to another entity, or even not produced the legal product
at issue. Precision in such analyses will of course never be attainable. But in
some cases, we may reach plausible and illuminating results.
The easiest and clearest such cases will typically be those cases to
which the Supreme Court has devoted significant time and effort, but which are
either relatively inconsequential, in terms of doctrinal constitutional and all
other values, or else that could be decided, with arguably equal overall public
value, for either party. Consider the opportunity cost of such cases. Those cases
could have been replaced on the Court's docket by cases that allow for the
possibility of the important advancement or defense of basic doctrinal
constitutional rights, or by cases that allow for avoiding substantial losses in
public well-being, including immense overall pecuniary losses.
But we can also learn from more complicated cases. We consider
below first some general background, and then a recent constitutional case, or
at least an apparent constitutional case, with disputed legislative facts. In
particular, we consider the related legal products, in both their statutory and
Supreme Court versions, in the symbolically laden and emotionally fraught
"Stolen Valor" case.
IV. CONTESTABLE LEGISLATIVE FACTS, A VANISHING CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUE, AND THE PROBLEM OF LOCATING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

A.

Some TheoreticalBackground

We have assumed that the Supreme Court will often hold a
comparative advantage over legislatures and agencies in resolving uncertainties
over important principled questions of constitutional right, along with other
important and high-valued activities often reflected in its annual docket. This is
not primarily a matter of the Court's own arguably self-serving declaration, in
Marbury v. Madison,97 that it is "the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is." 98
Instead, resolving important, high-value cases is how the Court most
valuably spends its time. The decrease in the public value, however measured,
of the Court's activities when it neglects such matters can be severe, in both
absolute and relative terms. The Court's superiority over other law-making
the agency rule as entitled only to weaker judicial deference under Skidmore); National Cable &
Telecom. Ass'n v. BrandX Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 981-82 (2005) (discussing Chevron
deference in the context of an agency's change of interpretation); Barnhartv. Walton, 535 U.S.
212, 222 (2002) (Breyer, J., for the Court, listing five factors to be considered, in a close case, in
choosing between relatively high Chevron stage two deference, and relatively low Skidmore
deference toward an agency's interpretation of a statutory term).
9
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
98

Id at 177.
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institutions at important doctrinal or principled constitutional matters may be
much greater than its superiority in other activities. Leaving such genuinely
important federal constitutional matters to Congress," the agencies, state
legislatures, or to state courts,100 while the Court addresses less significant
matters where it lacks a comparative or an even absolute advantage, seems illadvised from the standpoint of overall public well-being.
The principle that the Court holds a comparative advantage over other
law-producing institutions in determining matters of crucial constitutional
rights is, doubtless, not utterly without exception. But that principle reflects our
sense of the Court's relative detachment from current politics, its relative
insulation from political pressures and from most interest group influences,
differences in professional background, greater opportunities for reflection, and
0 Many of these general
institutional differences in professional ethos.o'
differences come into play most significantly in crucial constitutional cases.10 2
B.

The Alvarez "Stolen Valor" Case in Particular

But not all constitutional cases-indeed not all constitutional cases
involving individual first amendment rights-fit the above comparative
advantage template. Consider, as a likely such exception, the recent Supreme
Court case of United States v. Alvarez. 0 3 In our simplified version' 04 of the
Alvarez case, we envision a federal statute that criminalizes, under many
circumstances, the knowingly false assertion that the speaker has been awarded
any of several military medals. The statute in question' 05 makes no reference to
fraud, to any intent to obtain any benefit, or to any intended or actual tangible,
concrete harm to any person. 06 The statute would normally fall under the
classification of a content-based restriction on speech. 0 7

99

See id.

1oo See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 343-48 (1816).
1o1 For a classic background study, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986).
102 Consider the Court's willingness to reverse its own recent precedent on compulsory public
school Pledges of Allegiance, in the middle of the Second World War. See W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586 (1940).
103
132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
104 For a less oversimplified discussion of Alvarez, see R. George Wright, "What Is That
Honor?": Re-Thinking Free Speech in the "Stolen Valor" Case, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 847, 851
(2013).
05 The Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, 120 Stat. 3266 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 704 (2012)).
'0

See id

107

See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543-44 (plurality opinion).
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Whether the Supreme Court actually held a comparative advantage,
relative to Congress, in determining or "producing" the legal outcome in this
area is doubtful in the extreme. Several considerations lead us to that
conclusion. First, and most importantly, the Alvarez case presents a remarkably
narrow, and indeed almost entirely insignificant, regulation of speech that is
also remarkably even-handed toward any imaginable underlying viewpoint
anyone might wish to adopt. The circumstances in which anyone wishing to
make any meaningful statement, on any subject, must conclude that the best
way to make that point is to intentionally lie about, precisely, having personally
been awarded a military medal are vanishingly small, if not utterly nonexistent. If there is any speech-repressive impact to this statute, the reality of
such impact is microscopic.
The statute in question, even if assumed to have some detectable
genuine effect on freedom of speech, is as evenhanded as it is vanishingly
narrow. The statute is not skewed in relation to any imaginable viewpoint, pro
or con, on military medals; their purpose or value; the criteria or selectivity of
their award; military honor or honor in general; any military policy or practice;
or on war in general or any war in particular.108 Whether the Act more
generally undermines any of the typically cited underlying reasons or goals at
stake in specially protecting speech-including, ironically, the desire to
promote the search for truth-is also doubtful.109
Finally, and less significantly for our purposes, the nature and the
weight of the government interest in discouraging the dilution of the honor
associated with military medals resulting from intentionally false claims to
have personally been awarded such a medal is unusually difficult to pin down.
The Alvarez plurality's assessments in this respect are unsurprisingly not
clear. 110 And neither our contemporary culture, nor the broader historical
culture, is anything like unequivocal as to the public value, with or without
reference to medals, of either military honor"' in particular or honor in

general.112
In light of these unusual considerations, and especially of the minimal
free speech interest genuinely at stake in Alvarez, the typical logic"' of
attributing comparative advantage in producing principled constitutional free
speech law to the Court here seems largely, though not entirely, inapplicable.
The Court's opinion in Alvarez did, admittedly, resolve an emerging split in the
08
For elaborations and qualifications, see Wright, supra note 104, at n. 18 and accompanying
text.
109 See id. at notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
110 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2548-49.

I For one perspective, see Brief for the American Legion as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, UnitedStates v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210), 2011 WL 6210435.
112
For references, see Wright, supra note 104, at n.2.
113
See supra text accompanying notes 97-102.
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federal appellate circuits on a question of federal criminal law.1 14 But this
particular circuit split would not rank, in terms either of real constitutional
values or of economic stakes, as a high priority for resolution.
Let us then reasonably assume that if the Court had declined to address
the Stolen Valor Act, at the very least for a further term or two, it could instead
have addressed the constitutional or the economically most important case it
otherwise would have left unresolved. In any given Court term, there may be
obvious such candidates, and perhaps unique opportunities.
Observers with different priorities would arrive at different candidates
for the single most valuable and appropriate case as a replacement for Alvarez.
But some such cases are by consensus better than others. A complication is that
if litigants knew in advance that the Court was now more attuned to
considerations of comparative advantage in selecting its case docket, that might
raise the incentives of public interest groups and other litigants to press
important cases upon the Court. But on balance, that would hardly seem a bad
thing. The Court would still have the final say over its docket and caseload.
In any event, if the Court had not addressed Alvarez and the Stolen
Valor Act, it could instead have addressed some crucial issue of, say, national
environmental protection over the long term; energy independence; federal or
state-level budgeting or public pension obligations; immigration or any of
several broad civil rights issues; educational access or quality; or the separation
of powers regarding war and peace. For the Court to devote too much of its
docket to lesser cases will generally be inadvisable, for reasons roughly akin to
why pro athletes should not take time off from their valued professional
employment in order to cut their own or someone else's grass."'
From among the available pool of genuinely significant cases, the
Court presumably could have chosen a case the resolution of which would have
reflected the Court's comparative advantage. As we have seen, the Court is in
general more typically reflecting its comparative advantage when, from a
detached perspective, it reinforces or establishes a broad principle of basic
constitutional law or of the public well-being, rather than expending its own
scarce resources on more or less questionable re-examinations of matters of
legislative fact,"' contestable readings of legislative history," or engaging in
114 Contrast the Ninth Circuit result in United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2011)
(denying rehearing en banc), with an opposing Tenth Circuit result in United States v. Strandlof
667 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2012), vacated,684 F.3d 962 (10th Cir. 2012).
115 See Snapper Drafts Brett Favre to Promote its Lawn Mowers, supra note 42.
116 See supra Part II.B. For a sampling of resource-consuming but ultimately doubtful

Supreme Court re-findings of matters of legislative fact, sometimes consistent with the original
legislative determination, see, for example, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003)
(second-guessing the University of Michigan largely on the efficacy and affordability of
admissions policies at the undergraduate mass-application level); Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 506-07 (1996) (plurality opinion) (effectively second-guessing the state
legislature on the viability and degrees of effectiveness of alternative regulatory approaches);
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its own time-consuming extra-record research of dubious additional genuine
value." 8 There is at this point substantial public benefit to be derived from the
Court's increasing its attention to producing law where it can reasonably be
said to hold a comparative advantage over other law-making institutions.

Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (displaying extraordinary deference to the state's findings
of legislative fact in a dormant commerce clause context, where such deference is commonly
thought unjustified); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-64 (1905) (essentially taking issue
with the state's legislative judgment on matters of health and safety, though hinting, as well, at
the problem of organized interest group-dominated legislation at the expense of the broader,
unorganized public), overruled by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); RJ.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (re-assessing an extensive FDA
administrative record on the substantiality of the likelihood that the FDA's graphic warning label
regulations of cigarette packages would materially advance the stated interest in reducing
smoking rates).
117
See supra Part Il.C.
"

See supra Part III.D.
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